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This paper estimates a small New-Keynesian model with imperfect information and
optimal discretionary policy using data for the euro area. The model is used to assess the
usefulness of monetary aggregates and unit labour costs as information variables for monetary
policy. The estimates reveal that the information content of the M3 monetary aggregate
is limited. A more useful role emerges for the unit labour cost indicator, which contains
information on potential output that helps to reduce the volatility of the output gap. Finally,
the estimated weights for the objectives of monetary policy show that considerable importance
is attributed to interest-rate smoothing, greater than to output gap stabilization. This nding
indicates that the welfare gains of commitment may be smaller than suggested by typical
parametrizations of New-Keynesian models.
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Dynamic stochastic models of the “new Keynesian” variety developed by Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997), Woodford (1999) and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) have acquired
a solid position in the analysis of monetary policy. Such models have proved useful, for
example. to analyze the properties of various interest rate rules (Jensen, 2002) and to quantify
the welfare effects of simple versus optimal policy (Dennis and Söderström, 2002) and of
imperfect information (Ehrmann and Smets, 2003). Several central banks employ variants of
these models to inform policy analysis.
This paper estimates the structural parameters of such a model using data for the euro
area, under the assumptions of imperfect information and optimal discretionary policy. This
exercise adds useful elements to existing analyses.
First, integrating imperfect information in the new Keynesian model is important
because one of its key variables, “potential output” (i.e. the exible price level of output),
is not observable. This aspect adds to the fact that information about several other variables
of interest, such as contemporaneous GDP or ination, is available to policy-makers only
with lags and subject to statistical revisions. Previous quantitative analyses that deal with this
problem, e.g. Ehrmann and Smets (2003) and Coenen, Levin and Wieland (2002), proceeded
by separately estimating the information structure and the structural parameters (estimated
and/or calibrated). This separation is in principle problematic because, as Svensson and
Woodford (2000) show, the equilibrium motion of all variables depends on both the structural
parameters and the information structure when information is imperfect. An advantage of the
maximum likelihood estimation pursued here is that it allows this issue to be dealt with in a
consistent way, by jointly determining the economy’s structural parameters and the noisiness
of each indicator.2 Another advantage, recently highlighted by Lindé (2002), is that maximum
4 Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the December 2001 NBER conference on“Macroeconomic
policy in a dynamic, uncertain economy”, at the Bank of Italy, Federal Reserve Board, the Bank for International
Settlements and the Central European University. We beneted from extremely useful discussions with Athana-
sios Orphanides and from comments by Simon Gilchrist and David Small.
5 The joint presence of an optimization and a ltering problem is an important difference with respect to Ire-
land (2001), who estimates a small structural model for the US, assuming perfect information and an exogenous
policy rule.8
likelihood yields more precise estimates than limited information methods in the presence of
measurement error.
Second, since the model’s quantitative predictions hinge upon some key parameters,
estimation is important. For instance, Dennis and Söderström (2002) show that the welfare
gains delivered by commitment comparison with discretion vary signicantly, from almost nil
to very large, depending on the degree of forward-looking behaviour in the ination equation
and on the weight attached to the interest rate stabilization objective by the monetary authority.
Finally, the estimation of the monetary authorities’ objectives, obtained under the
assumption of optimal discretionary policy, distinguishes this paper from previous pioneering
estimation exercises, e.g. Ireland (2001) for the United States or Smets and Wouters (2003)
for the euro area, in which a “simple” instrument rule (i.e. restricted to depend on a few key
variables) is used to describe monetary policy.￿
The estimation results show that monetary aggregates contain little information about
the state variables of interest for the conduct of stabilization policy. M3 turns out to have
basically no usefulness for stabilization policy. The unit labour cost indicator, instead, helps
to improve the inference about potential output. This reduces the volatility of the output gap,
increasing the policy-maker’s welfare. Moreover, the estimates for the monetary authority’s
objectives show that a large weight is attached to ination, followed closely by the interest-
smoothing target and by a small output-gap weight. Several previous papers use a non-zero
weight on interest-smoothing in order to t the persistence of short-term rates, though the
values chosen are usually much smaller than the estimated ones. Our estimates, similar to the
ones by Dennis (2002) for the United States, imply that commitment gains are smaller than
suggested by typical calibrations.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section species a dynamic stochastic
monetary policy model that incorporatesan imperfect information problem, based on Ehrmann
andSmets(2003). Thesolutionofthis model, followingSvenssonandWoodford(2000), maps
the structural parameters into a vector autoregression. Section 3 discusses how to estimate
the model parameters using the Kalman lter following a methodology proposed by Sargent
6 Our endevour is similar to that of Dennis (2002), who estimates the policy preferences of the US Federal
Reserve. One remaining difference is our consideration of imperfect information aspects.9
(1989) and Ireland (2001) and presents the data, the estimation results and their robustness.
Section 4 utilizes the estimated model to quantify the welfare effects of the various indicators
and the welfare gains delivered by commitment. Section 5 summarizes the main ndings.
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where |, |, 
 | and 
| denote, respectively, ination, output, potential output and the nominal
short-term interest rate.
Our benchmark model, taken from Ehrmann and Smets (2003), consists of the following
structural equations:
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where | is real money and the subscript |n￿￿| denotes the expected value of a variable in
period 	conditional on information as of time . There are four structural i.i.d. innovations
in the model with covariance matrix 2
￿: a preference shock Rc|, a cost-push shock Sc|,a
potential output shock +c| and a money demand shock 6c|.
One reason for choosing this model is its relative simplicity, which allows for a
clear interpretation of the transmission mechanism of structural shocks. Moreover, the
specication encompasses purely forward looking models, such as the ones used, for example,10
by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999), and more backward
looking models as the one described in Rudebusch (2002).
The presence of lagged values in the output, ination and real money equations has been
shown to be important for tting the dynamics of the data. Smets and Wouters (2003) and
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) show that lagged terms in the output and ination
equations arise in the presence of, respectively, habits-in-consumption and Calvo-pricing rms
with indexation to last period ination.e Similarly, lagged and future real money in the money
demand equation can be introduced by assuming costly adjustment for money holdings. The
shocks can also be given a microfoundation. The cost-push shock Sc| that appears in the
ination equation emerges with a time-varying mark-up in the goods market (e.g. Smets and
Wouters, 2003), while the shock Rc| is obtained by introducing a random disturbance to the
utility function of the representative households. The money demand shock can be justied as
a shock to the real balances component of the utility function.
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where J
| is the indicator output variable, given by a noisy observation of the previous period
output level. This assumption models the fact that information on output | in a given quarter
is not contemporaneously available and that, moreover, output observations are subject to
revisions, which justies the existence of noisy measurement (+c|). The indicators J
| and
J
| posit that ination and real money balances are observed contemporaneously, possibly
with noise. Although no direct role for money exists in this model, as it does not affect any
of the payoff relevant variables or their transmission mechanism, the monetary indicator may
contain useful information on current output through the money demand equation (6), which
may help to reduce the imperfect information problem.
7 Both derivations also imply that the coefcients on the backward and forward terms sum to one.11
The last indicator, 
J
| is a noisy measure of the previous period’s real unit labour cost.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) show, among others, that such costs are proportional to the
output gap, which we capture by assuming:
|  |  
 | 

The measurement errors in the vector  are assumed to be i.i.d. with covariance matrix 2
￿.
2.1      

We focus on the discretionary (i.e. Markov perfect) equilibrium, whereby the strategies
of both the policy-maker and the agents are constrained to be functions of the predetermined
state variables alone (i.e. history-dependent strategies are ruled out).D
To solve the above model it is convenient to rewrite the system in the state-
space form following a Svensson and Woodford (2000), dening the vector ￿
| 

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of non-predetermined (forward looking) variables (see
Appendix B).
Information is described by the set |  ￿ 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 i.e. all agents in the




















The method of solving for the rational expectations solution of such a model under
the Markov perfect equilibrium (discretion) follows the theory outlined in Svensson and
Woodford (2000). We implement this method using the algorithms of Gerali and Lippi (2003).
8 Alternatively, the model could be solved and estimated for the optimal Ramsey policy, under the assump-
tion that the central bank can commit (see section 5).12
The solution yields the optimal Markov perfect policy (
|   |￿|) and the equilibrium
representation of the model, i.e. the law of motion of the state variables (|), forward-looking
variables (|) and the optimal prediction for | computed by the Kalman lter:
|n￿  | 	 |￿| 	 ￿|n￿ (9a)
|   |￿| 	  
￿|  |￿| (9b)
|￿|  |￿|3￿ 	 !|  |￿|3￿	| (9c)
where the matrices ￿  ￿and ! depend on the primitive parameters in  (see
Svensson and Woodford, 2000).
The linear quadratic structure of this problem and the certainty equivalence principle
imply that the optimal interest rate rule in this model, 
|   |￿| is a linear function of
the estimate of the states that does not depend on the uncertainty in the system. Of course
uncertainty affects the way in which an innovation in the observables is mapped into an
updated estimate of the state variables, which occurs through the Kalman gain matrix: !
&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The evolution of the whole economic system (9) can be expressed in a compact notation
using the vector autoregression:
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In particular, note that (10) allows the dynamics of the observable variables | and the nominal
interest rate 
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The data, represented by the vector &| used in the estimation, are given by the 3-month
interest rate, taken to be a noisy measure of the monetary policy control variable and the four
observables of the theoretical model, which are taken as noisy measures of the true (lagged)




&|   "| 	 $2c| (12)
$2c|   %| 	 '|
where '|   '￿c| ￿ is a vector of measurement errors in the data. Since we
already have measurement errors in the theoretical model (the vector ), the measurement
errors in '| associated to the | variables are assumed to be identically zero to avoid
redundancy. Instead, the introduction of a measurement error for the interest rate is needed
to avoid a stochastic singularity problem, as the theoretical model predicts that the interest
rate is a linear function of the state variables. By introducing the measurement error '￿c| we
create a wedge between the optimal rate predicted by the model and the actual rate recorded
in the data. This makes estimation possible. The standard deviation of the measurement error
'￿c| can be interpreted as a measure of the distance between actual policy and the optimal one
prescribed by the model.
Equations (10) and (12) represent a state space system to which a Kalman lter can be
applied to estimate the structural model parameters, . The basic insight rests on the fact that
the solution of the theoretical model maps the structural parameters  into the matrices  #
     ,  %, 2
￿ and 2
￿ which fully characterize the system (10) and (12). Given this system, the
Kalman lter provides a convenient method of computing the likelihood function associated
with a vector of observations on &|. The estimation problem thus consists in nding the vector
of parameters  that maximizes the likelihood function. The idea, originally due to Sargent
(1989), McGrattan (1994) and Ireland (2001), is illustrated in more detail in Appendix C.S
3.1  
The data used in the estimation are the euro area counterparts of the variables in the
vector | and 
|: output, which is measured by real GDP, the ination rate, measured by the
9 One difference in comparison with previous contributions is that we integrate measurement errors in the
theoretical specication of the structural model, not just as a wedge between the data and the theoretical model.14
quarterly changes in the GDP deator, real money, measured by the stock of nominal M3
divided by the GDP deator, the (lagged) output gap indicator, measured by (lagged) real unit
labour costs and the nominal short-term interest rate. These data, which run from 1981:1 to
2002:2, contain a subsample during which the euro area was not formally established (until
the end of 1998). Euro area data for this subsample are taken from Fagan, Henry and Mestre
(2001), who aggregate national data (See Appendix A).
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Figure 1: Ination (actual and objective)
Stationarity of the time series is achieved by means of the Hodrick-Prescott lter with
the only exception of the ination rate and the short-term interest rate. This procedure was
preferred over linear detrending since it ensured the elimination of unit roots. With respect to
theinationratewefollowGerlachandSvensson(2003)inmodellinganimplicittime-varying
ination objective for the euro area as a whole. These authors assume that the euro area

















| denote, respectively, the Bundesbank and the euro area ination objectives.
This specication introduces two additional parameters that need to be estimated: the speed
of adjustment, Z, and the difference between the Bundesbank and the euro area objective in15
the rst period of the sample: ￿e6
f K
f. Both parameters are estimated jointly with the other
model parameters. Figure 1 reports the estimated ination objective for the euro area and the
ination rate (annualized, in per cent)..
Given the estimated ination objective we construct the implicit objective for the short-
term interest rate dividing ￿e6
| by the discount rate  0.9949, calibrated to match the
average real interest rate between 1998 and 2002 (a period in which ination uctuates around
the target the implied real three-month interest rate is 2.0 per cent). The data used in the




















































Figure 2: Detrended data
The likelihood function is constructed using the Kalman lter and is maximized with
respect to the structural parameters in  and (13). The rst four observations of the data (from
1981:1 to 1981:4) are used to initialize the Kalman lter as in Smets and Wouters (2003).
The parameter  linking the output gap to unit labour costs (equation 8) cannot be pinned
down precisely by the data independently of the value of  (see equation 4). A unit value
was therefore chosen for  in the estimation, which amounts to a normalization on the value
of . Estimation of the model parameters with alternative values of  does not signicantly
alter the quantitative conclusions of this paper. The estimates of the parameters are reported in






(see Table 1) are remarkably similar to those of Gerlach and Svens-
son (2003).16
Table 1.H With the exception of 2 (the forward component of money demand) and (￿c6 (the




The wide range of calibrated values used in the literature on optimal monetary policy
to describe the preferences of the monetary authority makes estimation interesting. In most
calibrationsthecoefcientoftheoutputgaprangesbetween0and1whileasmallercoefcient,
between 0 and 0.5, is chosen for the weight on interest rate changes (e.g. Ehrmann and Smets,
2003, and Dennis and Söderström, 2002). These parameters are crucial in quantifying, for
example, the gains from commitment and in shaping the dynamics of output, ination and the
nominal interest rate. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst attempt to measure these
parameters for the euro area.b The estimates indicate a small weight for the output gap (0.06)
and a large weight for the interest rate adjustment term (0.74). This empirical nding, similar
to that of Dennis (2002) for the United States, suggests that the monetary authority is much
more concerned with uctuations in the ination rate and the interest rate than with the output
gap. Note how the estimated values differ substantially from the ones used in calibrations: for
example in the benchmark calibration in Ehrmann and Smets (2003) the weights are set at 1
and 0.1 for, respectively, the output gap and the changes in the interest rate.
The estimates concerning the structural equations show that  the forward and
backward components of output and ination dynamics are important. This nding is
consistent with previous studies, e.g. Gali and Gertler (1999) and Lindé (2002), who reject
either a fully-backward or a fully-forward specication. In particular, the estimated degree
of backwardness is quite large (high  and ) for both variables. With respect to the interest
rate elasticity (
) our estimate is smaller than the ones in Andres et al. (2001) and Smets and
Wouters (2003), but within the range of values found in the literature. Moreover, we nd a
low elasticity of ination to the output gap () as in Smets and Wouters (2003).￿f Finally,
; The likelihood function is maximized using the algorithm csminwel.m by C. Sims. This routine is
robust to discontinuities in the objective function.
< Dennis (2002) develops a similar exercise for the US.
43 There is little consensus on the value of the slope of the new Phillips curve in the literature. The estimates17
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the estimated money demand equation detects a large degree of backwardness (large ￿), a
small interest rate elasticity and a rather small elasticity with respect to current output (+).
In principle, a greater value of + implies that monetary aggregates contain a clearer signal
about current output. The nding of a small coefcient suggests that information on monetary
aggregates is unlikely to be of much use as an information variable (see Section 4).
The standard deviations of the structural shocks ((￿) indicate that innovations in
potential output are the most volatile. This result is in line with the empirical ndings of
Ireland (2001) for the United States and of Smets and Wouters (2003) for the euro area. Quite
importantly, the estimationshows that measurement errorsinthe observables((￿) play a rather
minor role, as their standard deviation is smaller than the structural innovations. Real money
is the variable which is measured with the highest precision (the standard deviation is not
signicantly different from zero), while the largest measurement error is detected for ination
(0.26 percentage points). Finally, the discrepancy between the model-based optimal interest
rate and the one in the data, (e￿, is on average about half a percentage point.
Figure 3 reports the actual and tted values for the variables used in the maximum
likelihood estimation.￿￿ The model forecasting performance within the sample is modest as
far as concerns the ination rate. The correlation between the one-step-ahead prediction and
actual ination is around 0.5, which shows that the estimated equations are unable to capture
the high frequency uctuations that occur in the data for the ination rate (see the second box
in the gure). This indicates that while the model captures the dynamics of a “core ination”
component, a large portion of the high frequency movements of quarterly ination are affected
by measurement error. A similar result is found by Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003), who show
range from a minimum value of 0.015 for the US (Galí and Gertler, 1999) to a maximum of 0.39 (Orphanides
and Wieland, 2000). With respect to the euro area, Smets and Wouters (2002) estimate a slope of 0.007, which is
pretty close to our estimate. Calibrated values for this parameter for the euro area range between 0.03 and 0.08
(Casares, 2001, 2002).
44 E.g., in the case of output the gure reports the observed data r
w and the estimate of true output, wmw Their
difference can be decomposed into both measurement (r
w  w and t( w  wmw errors.19
that integrating measurement errors for ination within the standard Calvo pricing model helps





















































Figure 3: Actual (dashed line) and tted data
The model forecasting performance is substantially better with respect to real GDP
(0.81), real money M3 (0.86), the short-term nominal interest rate (0.86) and real unit labour
costs (0.75).￿2 Signicant improvements in performance can be obtained by enriching the
model specication with additional equations, along the lines followed by Smets and Wouters
(2003). For the purposes of this paper, however, we chose to develop the analysis using the
parsimonious model presented in Section 2.
3.3    
The robustness of the estimates was tested along two dimensions. First, we re-
estimated the model over a shorter period (1990:1-2002:2), during which the euro area is
characterized by a greater degree of homogeneity, such as the adoption of similar ination
targets. The convergence of ination objectives is a direct consequence of the Maastricht
45 The ratio between the standard deviation of the forecast errors in a given variable and the standard devi-
ation of the same variable is equal to 0.59 for output, 0.86 for ination, 0.50 for real money, 0.66 for real unit
labour costs and 0.57 for the interest rate.20
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Treaty, which imposed on the candidate countries several criteria for accessing the third phase
of the European Monetary Union. Based on this observation, the model estimation over this
subperiod imposes a common 2.0 per cent ination objective. This choice is consistent with
the implicit ination objective that was estimated above for the full sample (1981:1-2002:2
s e eF i g u r e1 ) .
Table 2 reports the estimated parameters with the corresponding standard errors. A
comparison of Tables 1 and 2 shows that most parameters are quite stable across the two
samples, even though a few parameters (in particular  and ) become insignicant in the
shorter sample. Some differences emerge regarding the measurement errors of output, which
are smaller in the short sample. The standard deviations of the structural shocks are essentially
unchanged. The parameter measuring the degree of backwardness of ination is smaller in
the short sample (0.56 compared with 0.71) and the same is true for output (0.68 compared
with 0.75). The parameters in the money demand equation are stable, even though the output
elasticity becomes not signicantly different from zero. The largest difference between the
two sets of estimates concerns the central bank’s preferences: in the short sample the weight21
attached to the output gap is zero while the weight on the changes in the interest rate is larger
than in the full sample (1.11 compared with 0.74).
As a second robustness check, two alternatives were considered to measure ination
deviations from target over the full sample. The rst assumes a constant ination target of
2 per cent, the second uses HP-ltered ination as the measure of ination deviations. The
estimates of most structural parameters are not substantially affected by these alternatives,
with the exception of the degree of ination backwardness and the parameters of the central
bank loss function. When the constant ination objective of 2 per cent is used, the output gap
weight increases (to around 0.25) and the interest-adjustment weight decreases (to around 0.5)
in comparison with the benchmark estimates of Table 1. When HP ltered ination is used,
both the ination backwardness and the output-gap weight decrease in comparison with the
benchmark.￿￿
These robustness checks reveal that the degree of ination backwardness and the weight
attached to the output gap in the central bank loss function are sensitive to the sample period
and to the method chosen to detrend ination. However, it is important to stress for the
purposes of this paper that the instability of these parameters does not affect the qualitative and
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Theestimated modelischaracterized by theoptimalmonetary policy rule 
|   |￿|,t h e
coefcients of which are reported in the Table 3. The standard errors are computed by means
of Monte Carlo simulations. The optimal rule reacts strongly to the cost-push shock which has
important effects on ination. The weight on lagged ination is also large. The coefcient on
potential output is negative and signicant: an increase in potential output requires the central
bank to accommodate the shock to stabilize ination and the output gap. The coefcients on
46 More detailed results for these estimates are available from the authors upon request.22












lagged real money and the money demand shock are zero: these two variables have no direct





















Figure 4: Optimal and realized short-term interest rate
Figure 4 reports the time series for the interest rate that is implied by the optimal rule,
together with 95 per cent condence bands (dashed lines) and the realized 3-month interest
rate (solid line) over the estimation period. It shows that, on average, the optimal rate implied
by the theoretical model tracks the actual interest rate sufciently well.
In order to provide an intuitive interpretation of the optimal monetary policy rule
reported in Table 3, we estimated a “Taylor” rule over the data generated by a simulation
of the model under the optimal discretionary policy. The chosen specication of the “Taylor”23
Table 4. Information and forecast error about fundamental shocks
With Measurement Error Without Meas. Error
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rule constrains the interest rate to be a linear function of the contemporaneous estimates of the
output gap, ination and the lagged interest rate: 
|  *%|￿| 	 *Z|￿| 	 *=
|3￿ . The ordinary
least squareregressionexplainsmorethan97percent ofthevariabilityofthe optimal rule. The
estimated coefcients, which are all signicant at conventional 5 per cent condence level, are
0.13 on the output gap, 0.52 on ination and 0.87 on thelagged interest rate. These coefcients
imply a strong long-run response of the interest rate to ination and a milder one to the output
gap (the coefcients are, respectively, around 5 and 1).￿e
( # )) ) !)$!
Theestimatesprovidequantitativeinformationontheextentoftheimperfectinformation
problem in the model. Column  of Table 4 reports the (unconditional) standard deviation
of the contemporaneous forecast errors about the fundamental shocks that the agents in the
model face when information is processed optimally (using the Kalman lter) and both the
monetary and the unit labour cost indicators are used. It shows that the largest forecast errors
pertain to the innovations in potential output. This is partly due to the relatively large size
of the innovations affecting this variable (see Table 1) and partly to the noisiness of the unit
labour cost indicator used to forecast this variable.
The other columns analyze how the forecast errors change as we vary the information
available to agents. This is done in the following manner. Under the assumption that the
economy’s true parameters are those reported in Table 1, we remove the ULC (or Money)
from the vector of observables (|) and analyze its economic consequences. Finally, in the last
column, we study the case in which there is no measurement error in the observables. Under
the assumption that the true economic parameters are correctly identied by the estimates of
Table 1 each of these experiments represents a counterfactual example.
47 Other properties of the estimated model can be described by means of impulse response functions, omitted24
When the monetary indicator is taken out of the vector of observables | (see column
), the forecast errors about the money demand innovation naturally increase, but the
forecast errors about the innovations in output (the preference shock), potential output and
the cost push shock are virtually unaffected. While the M3 indicator may, in principle,
allow a better identication of the fundamental shocks (including potential output and cost
push shocks), the analysis reveals that its use improves the identic a t i o no fm o n e yd e m a n d
shocks, slightly improves the identication of output shocks, but does not contribute to the
identication of potential output and cost push shocks. The reason lies in the low signal to
noise ratio of the monetary indicator, which originates from the small elasticity of money
demand to output (+), the large standard deviation of the money demand equation ((￿c6)a n d
the small ination elasticity to the output gap ().
The next experiment, reported in column , considers dropping the unit labour cost
indicator from the information set of the policy-maker. It shows that this indicator contains
signicant information on potential output, as the forecast errors about this variable increase
signicantly. As expected, there is no information of interest about the other fundamental
variables, whose forecast errors are essentially unchanged.
As abenchmarkofcomparison, columnreportsthestandard deviationoftheforecast
errors that is obtained in the absence of measurement error (i.e. when 2
￿  ). It shows
that, even with perfect measurement, an incomplete information problem persists about actual
and potential output. This is due to the assumption that information on these variables is
available only with a lag. This benchmark also shows that when both indicators are used the
forecast errors on output and money demand shocks are as small as they would be if there
were no measurement error. Forecast errors about potential output remain slightly above this
benchmark even when the unit labour cost indicator is used (columns  and ).
4.1       #

The forecast errors discussed above inuence the unconditional volatility of the main
variables inthemodel. Table5 reports thestandard deviation ofthe threegoalvariables(output
gap, ination and interest rate changes), together with the unconditional value of expected
losses. The table considers three alternative information assumptions. As before, the spirit of
here for reasons of space. These are available from the authors upon request.25
Table 5. Targets volatility and the value of losses
with measurement error
  !  "  ! "
  
)&|  | 1.5 1.5 1.6
)&| 0.13 0.13 0.11
)&
|  
|3￿ 0.17 0.16 0.14
| 36.13 36.10 36.56
% change in | w.r. to  - -0.1 1.2
the exercise is to use the estimated model to analyze how economic performance (volatilities,
welfare) changes in each of these scenarios.
The results for the benchmark case in which both the monetary and the unit labour cost
indicator are used appear in column . Let us compare the volatility of the targets in this
case with the one obtained when no monetary indicator is available and only the unit labour
cost indicator is used. As shown in column  of Table 4, this change in the information set
causes forecast errors about innovations in current and potential output to increase only by a
very small amount. The target volatilities reported in Table 5 indicate that economic targets
are basically unaffected by the removal of monetary aggregates from the information set. A
smaller variance in one of the three goal variables leads to a moderate decrease in the losses of
the policy maker. Less information about output innovations turns out to be good for welfare
as it leads to a smaller volatility of target variables.￿D
Quantitativelynoticeableconsequencesemerge, instead, whentheoutputgapindicatoris
taken away from the agent’s information set (column ). In this case, the greater uncertainty
surrounding the estimate of potential output leads to a signicant reduction in monetary policy
activism (e.g. a smaller volatility of interest rate changes) and to a greater output gap volatility.
These effects arise entirely from the effect of uncertainty on the estimates of the states (i.e.
through the matrix ! in the updating equation (9c)), since the vector  of the optimal control
rule (
|   |￿|) does  depend on the uncertainty.￿S As shown in the bottom line of the
table, these changes increase the losses of the policy-maker in comparison with the benchmark
48 Inamodelwithforward-lookingvariables,lessinformation(forboththeagentsandthepolicy-maker)may
cause endogenous variables to be less responsive to the new information, reducing their volatility and increasing
welfare. Further results on this point are available from the authors upon request.
49 Due to the certainty equivalence feature of this problem (see Svensson and Woodford, 2000).26
Table 6. The welfare effects of commitment
Our Model Model with:
(   and 	  )    and 	  
Discretion Commitment Discretion Commitment
  +_ +S
)&|  | 1.5 1.5 1.02 1.02
)&| 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.15
)&
|  
|3￿ 0.17 0.18 2.5 2.6
| 36.1 36.0 118.3 117.8
% change w.r. to &
),- - -0.2 - -0.4
case by approximately 1 per cent. This nding suggests that the unit labour cost indicator is
useful as it allows the policy-maker to implement a welfare superior stabilization policy.
4.2  #
   
Svensson (1997), Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (1999) highlighted that
the forward-looking elements in the new Keynesian model give rise to a form of time
inconsistency.￿. This is also known as the problem of the “stabilization bias”. In a model with
forward-looking agents the optimal prescription is that shocks should be stabilized gradually,
i.e. policy displays a form of history dependence. This allows stabilization costs to be
smoothed over time. One interpretation of the commitment solution is that, after a shock
hits the economy, the policy-maker announces a path of current and future policy responses to
this shock and sticks to it afterwards. Unfortunately, this plan cannot be implemented under a
Markov-perfect equilibrium in which policy cannot be made contingent on past “promises”.￿H
Under discretion, ination in the new-Keynesian model is excessively volatile in comparison
with the commitment benchmark. The estimated model allows us to quantify the welfare gains
of commitment.
Columns  and  of Table 6 report the outcomes of the target variables which
originate, respectively, under discretion and commitment.￿b It appears that under commitment
4: This is an instance of the more general time-inconsistency problem brought out by Kydland and Prescott
(1977).
4; Technically, under discretion (Markov-perfect equilibrium) policy is function of the state variables alone
while, under commitment, the Lagrange multipliersof the forward-looking variables (costate variables) also enter
the optimal policy rule.
4< The “separation principle” which holds for this model implies that the information content of indicator
variables (e.g. the mean square forecast error of the state variables) is not affected by the equilibrium notion27
interest-rate changes are more volatile while ination and the output gap are more stable. This
reduces losses by about 0.2 per cent.
Columns +_ and +S of Table 6 compare the outcomes of discretion and
commitment for a model in which the preference weights of the monetary authority are closer
to the values usually employed in the literature, i.e. a relatively small weight is chosen for
interest smoothing (	  ) and a relatively large one is given to the output gap (  ).
The bottom line of the table shows that under this parametrization the gains from commitment
are twice as large as in the estimated model: losses are reduced by about 0.4 per cent.
* % !' $+
This paper uses maximum likelihood to estimate a small new-Keynesian model for the
euro area. The model accounts for imperfect information about the state of the economy and
is used to assess the role of imperfect information and the usefulness of indicators, namely
monetary aggregates and unit labour costs, in the conduct of monetary policy. Moreover, by
assuming optimal discretionary policy, the estimates allow us to characterize policy in terms
of the relative weights assigned to the targets: ination, the output gap and the volatility of the
short-term interest rate.
The equilibrium characterization involves the solution of an optimal control and ltering
problem, as in Svensson and Woodford (2000). Once this is done, the model is estimated
using maximum likelihood. Overall, the broad indications that emerge from the estimates
are consistent with previous ndings. In particular, both forward and backward looking
components are important to characterize the dynamics of ination and output, as found by
Gali and Gertler (1999) and Lindé (2002). Moreover, the estimates show that measurement
error in ination is useful in bringing the new-Keynesian model to the data, as found by
Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003).
As to the role of indicator variables, the analysis shows that M3 does not help to get
a better identication of the state variables of interest for stabilization policy. In particular,
it delivers no information about potential output and cost push shocks. Therefore, the model
suggests a limited usefulness of the M3 indicator. A more useful role emerges for the unit
labour costs indicator, which contains information on potential output that helps to reduce the
(commitment/discretion).28
volatility of the output gap. These ndings, which lie at the centre of our analysis, are robust
to the re-estimation of the model over the more recent sample (1990-2002) and to alternative
detrending of the data.
Finally, the estimated weights for the targets of monetary policy suggest that the largest
weight is attached to ination, followed closely by the interest-smoothing target and by a small
weight for the output-gap. These values, which are quite different from the ones employed in
calibration exercises, are similar to those estimated by Dennis (2002) for the United States.
The relatively large weight of interest-smoothing suggested by our estimates implies that the
welfare gains delivered by commitment are smaller than in typical parametrizations. This
happens because the discretionary monetary response to shocks is gradual, replicating an
essential feature of commitment policy (Woodford, 1999).,,!- .   
All data are quarterly and seasonally adjusted. The source for the real GDP, the GDP
deator and unit labour costs is EUROSTAT for the period running from 1991:1 to 2002:3.
The data for the period from 1981:1 to 1990:4 are constructed recursively using the starting
value (1991:1) of the EUROSTAT series and the growth rates of the corresponding series from
the Area Wide Model (AWM) database constructed by Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2001). The
source for the stock of nominal money, M3, is the European Central Bank. The source for the
short-term nominal interest rate is the AWM database for the period running from 1981:1 to
1998:4. For the period up to 2002:2 the interest rate is taken to be the three-month Euribor
rate. The source is the European Central Bank.,,!- 
. /, )$ %! ) # 
 $%
























where the vector ￿
| 









denote, respectively, predetermined and non-predetermined (forward looking)
variables at time  and 
| is the instrument controlled by the central bank.
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In this section we describe how to compute the likelihood function for the model
described in Section 2. Recall the state-space representation of the model (equations 3.10
a n d3 . 1 2i nS e c t i o n3 )i s :





&|   "| 	 $2c| $2c|   %| 	 '|
where the rst equation is the law of motion of the unobserved states "|n￿ and the second is
the observation equation linking observed variables &| to the unobserved states.
The vector of structural shocks | and the measurement errors | a r ea s s u m e dt ob e
independent i.i.d. processes with covariance matrices 2
￿ and 2
￿.T h eK a l m a nlter consists
of a system of recursive equations that allows us to forecast the unobserved state vector using
the information contained in the observed variables.
The recursive system for computing the Kalman lter is given by the following
equations:
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￿
(16)
where the matrix !| is the Kalman gain and 2
|n￿￿|  ,4"|n￿  "|n￿￿|. The covariance



















































The prediction errors of the observed variables &|, which are used to compute the
likelihood function, are given by:
5|  &|  &|￿|3￿  &|   "|￿|3￿ 
where &|￿|3￿ is the forecast of the observed variables based on the information available up to
period    and:





￿ 	 32 
is the covariance matrix of the vector of prediction errors.



















where 6 is the number of variables in vector &| and 7 is the sample size.)
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